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PLURALISM AND PROPERTY 
Gregory S. Alexander*
INTRODUCTION 
 
Welfarism is no longer the only game in the town of property theory.1
 
* A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University.  I am deeply grateful to Josh Chafetz, 
Hanoch Dagan, Nestor Davidson, Ori Herstein, Mitchell Lasser, Eduardo Peñalver, Emily 
Sherwin, and Laura Underkuffler for help with this Article.  I am also grateful to Nick 
Sturgeon for very helpful conversations. 
  In 
the last several years a number of property scholars have begun developing 
various versions of a general vision of property and ownership that, 
although consistent with welfarism in some respects, purports to provide an 
alternative to the still-dominant welfarist account.  This alternative proceeds 
under different labels, including “virtue theory” and “progressive,” but for 
convenience purposes let us call them collectively “social obligation” 
theories.  For what they have in common is a desire to correct the common 
but mistaken notion that ownership is solely about rights.  These scholars 
emphasize the social obligations that are inherent in ownership, and they 
seek to develop a non-welfarist theory grounding those inherent social 
obligations. 
  This Article was presented at the Social Function of Property:  A Comparative 
Perspective conference at Fordham University School of Law in May 2011, and at the 
Progressive Property Workshop held at McGill University in May 2011.  It was also 
presented at a Summer Faculty Legal Theory Workshop at Cornell Law School in July 2011.  
I am deeply grateful to all of the participants at those events for their comments and 
suggestions.  The usual disclaimer applies. 
 1. Not that it ever was.  Welfarism, or, more simply, law and economics, has had at 
least two other competitors in American property theory.  Personhood theory, most 
commonly associated with the well-known work of Margaret Jane Radin, see, e.g., Margaret 
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982), whose views I discuss 
in Part II.B.4, is an alternative to welfarism.  However, for various reasons, not the least of 
which was the fact that, unlike welfarism, the personhood theory is not and does not purport 
to be a comprehensive theory of property, I do not consider the personhood theory to be a 
true competitor with welfarism or social obligation theories.  Both at a positive and 
normative level, its force is limited.  Its ambition is more limited than that of the social 
obligation theories I examine in this Article. 
  The second alternative to welfarism in modern American property theory is 
libertarianism.  The most notable exemplar of a libertarian view of property is Richard 
Epstein, whose work I briefly discuss in Part III.B.  As others have noted, however, 
Epstein’s libertarianism is leavened with a good measure of utilitarianism.  Barbara Fried has 
recently argued that the same is true of Robert Nozick, who is also commonly identified as 
libertarian. See Barbara Fried, Does Nozick Have a Theory of Property Rights? (Stanford 
Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 1782031, 2011) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782031. 
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These social obligation theories have attracted no shortage of critics.2  
No critic, however, has raised an ambiguity that characterizes most, if not 
all, of the work in this vein.  Although social obligation theorists have been 
clear about their commitment to the idea that ownership imposes 
affirmative as well as negative duties to other members of their 
communities, they have not always been clear about the normative basis or 
bases of those duties.  More specifically, they have not always indicated 
whether their theory is value monist or value pluralist; that is, whether it 
rests on a commitment to a single overriding moral value or multiple moral 
values.  Of course, this is a fundamental question not only for social 
obligation theorists but also all property scholars engaged in projects of 
developing general normative theories of property, including welfare 
theorists.3  Whether they believe that a single value guides, and should 
guide, all of property law or that no single view of the good either can or 
should underlie all of property law’s contextual and doctrinal diversity, 
property theorists must explicitly acknowledge and explain their position on 
this basic question.4
This Article has two objectives.  The first is to clarify the positions on the 
monism-pluralism question among social obligation property theorists.  
Because so few theorists have explicitly confronted that question, I try to 
tease out their positions from their normative work, recognizing full well 
that this approach risks attributing views that the author does not hold at all.  
My second objective is normative.  I argue, albeit briefly, in favor of value 
pluralism as the morally superior approach, one that is both analytically and 
normatively more defensible. 
 
 
 2. See, e.g., Eric Claeys, Virtue and Rights in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 889 (2009); Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap:  The Indirect Relation Between Ends and 
Means in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009); Katrina M. Wyman, 
Should Property Scholars Embrace Virtue Ethics?  A Skeptical Comment, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 991 (2009). 
 3. Given their express commitment to maximizing social welfare, welfare theorists 
would seem to be value monists. See Roger Crisp, Well-Being, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (rev. Dec. 9, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/well-
being/.  Although they may take cognizance of putative values, such as pleasure, friendship, 
health, and so on, they treat these as only instrumental values rather than ends themselves.  
Moreover, welfare theorists consider these instrumental values to be fully commensurable, 
indeed reducible to a common metric.  As I discuss in Part I, these are characteristics of 
value monism. 
 4. Professor Hanoch Dagan has argued, correctly in my view, that property theorists 
must also be clear about their position regarding monism or pluralism in a structural sense; 
that is, whether property law facilitates diverse social and resource realms (say, à la Michael 
Walzer, the domestic realm, the commercial realm, the realm of intellectual property, the 
realm of residential rental property, and so on), each of which is governed by a different 
value or balance within a set of values, or on the other hand, whether all of property law is 
structured around a single core principle or right, such as the right to exclude.  Although I 
agree entirely with Professor Dagan in rejecting structural monism, my focus in this Article 
is principally on value monism and pluralism.  As Professor Dagan points out, structural 
pluralism can rely on a pluralist theory of value. See Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and 
Perfectionism in Private Law, 10–11 (June 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868198. 
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The discussion proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a brief explanation 
of the terms monism and pluralism as they are used in modern value theory.  
Part II sets forth a taxonomy of various social obligation property theorists’ 
views on the monist versus pluralist approach to values.  Part III then takes 
a normative turn, arguing in support of value pluralism generally and how 
my social obligation theory specifically conforms to such an approach.  It 
also discusses the problem of incommensurability that arises under value 
pluralism.  I argue that the incommensurability of competing values does 
not warrant the conclusion that no rational choice between them is possible.  
Rational choice is possible, but this does not mean that only one rational 
solution is always possible.  An unavoidable, and perhaps tragic, 
consequence of pluralism is that in cases in which two or more 
incommensurable values are involved, there will sometimes be situations in 
which more than one rational choice is available.  There is not always a 
single correct answer.  But that does not mean that no rational solution is 
possible.  Such is the human condition. 
The value monism versus value pluralism problem is not unique to 
property theory.  This Article could have been written just as easily about 
contract or tort theory as well as other topics of legal theory.  Property 
theory happens to be the domain that I know best.  Scholars in other fields 
may find this Article useful for their own purposes.  If so, they may wish to 
skip Part II, which deals specifically with property scholarship. 
I.  MONISM AND PLURALISM IN VALUE THEORY 
Value monism and pluralism each come in several flavors, and, like 
chocolate and mocha, the differences between and among them are subtle 
and not always easy to discern.  This makes the battle lines between 
monism and pluralism somewhat murky.  In this part, I provide a rough 
sketch of the two positions and the main points of disagreement between 
them, fully acknowledging that I have glossed over some important details. 
At bottom, the debate between value monism and value pluralism is 
about the structure of moral values.  There are, of course, many moral 
values at work in moral theory, but how do these different values relate to 
each other?  In ordinary conversation, we commonly speak of many values 
that matter to us in our lives—love, friendship, happiness, freedom, and so 
on—and we talk as though they are all different from each other.  In value 
theory terms, the question is whether all of these values can really be 
reduced to one basic value or whether instead they in fact are distinct from 
each other.5  Monists hold that the former is correct, whereas pluralists take 
the latter view.6
The monist–pluralist dichotomy cuts across another set of distinctions 
that is familiar in moral theory, the three basic approaches to normative 
moral theory.  These approaches are, of course, consequentialism, 
 
 
 5. See Elinor Mason, Value Pluralism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July 
29, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/value-pluralism/. 
 6. Id. 
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deontology, and virtue ethics.7  There is no necessary correlation between 
any of these approaches and either of the ways of thinking about values, so 
in theory a monist could be a consequentialist, deontologist, or virtue ethics 
proponent.  Similarly, a pluralist could subscribe to any one of the three 
moral theories.  No moral theory has its own unique or distinctive way of 
looking at values.  There are differences, however, in the ways in which 
adherents of the three types of moral theory look at the nature of value 
itself.  Consequentialists look at value in terms of goods, such as 
knowledge, beauty, health, and so on.8  They see value as residing in such 
goods.  Consequentialists are not the only moral theorists to perceive values 
in these terms; virtue ethicists hold this understanding of values as well.9  
Deontologists, however, do not.  Rather than translating values into goods, 
their vocabulary is one of rules and principles.10
Regardless of their understanding of values, monists make the same basic 
claim.  There is, they claim, only one fundamental value, whether that value 
is framed in terms of goods or principles.  So, for example, Immanuel Kant 
was a deontologist, and he was also a monist, for he argued that all moral 
principles are based on a single, objective moral value, namely, humanity 
(or human dignity), which he describes as having “absolute” and 
“objective” worth as an end in itself.
  They ask about a plurality 
of principles, or a single overarching principle, rather than values or goods. 
11  Similarly, utilitarians are monists, 
although they take a consequentialist, rather than a deontological, meta-
ethical position.  Utilitarians usually insist that there is only one moral 
value, variously termed as pleasure, happiness, social utility, or welfare.12
Pluralists resist such reductionism.  They hold that there may be multiple 
values that are equally valid and equally fundamental and that these values 
sometimes conflict with each other.
  
They recognize that other goods—such as friendship, honor, and 
knowledge—exist, but they argue that all such goods are merely 
instrumental goods insofar as they serve to achieve the same basic good. 
13
Different forms, or levels, of pluralism must be distinguished from each 
other.  At the bottom level, in the sense of being most singular, is 
  Moreover, as we shall later see, 
pluralists often regard conflicting yet equally valid moral values to be 
incommensurable in the sense that there is no possible hierarchical ordering 
of them in terms of importance or weight. 
 
 7. Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July 
18, 2007), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/ethics-virtue/. 
 8. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 9, 2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/
consequentialism/#WhaGooHedVsPluCon (citing GEORGE EDWARD MOORE, PRINCIPIA 
ETHICA 83–85, 194 (1903)). 
 9. See Mason, supra note 5. 
 10. See Hursthouse, supra note 7. 
 11. IMMANUEL KANT, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL KANT:  PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 37, 78 [4:428–29] 
(Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). 
 12. MOORE, supra note 8, at 107; see also Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in 
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 30, 32–33 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). 
 13. See Mason, supra note 5. 
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foundational pluralism.  This view holds that pluralism exists all the way 
down to the most basic level so that there is no single value by which we 
can judge the goodness of all other values.14  The best example of 
conflicting views regarding foundational pluralism comes from articles by 
G.E. Moore and Judith Jarvis Thomson.  Moore argued that goodness is 
unanalyzable.15  He contends that when a person says that something is 
“good” the meaning is not purely descriptive, such as the thing contributes 
to happiness.16  There is no getting beneath good; it is intrinsically basic.  
Thomson replied that there is a basic plurality of ways of being good.  If I 
say that the movie was good, there are a number of different senses or ways 
in which the movie could be good, and these different senses of the movie’s 
goodness are sufficiently distinct from each other that they cannot all be 
reduced to something that they all share in common.17
At the next level up is normative pluralism, sometimes called preference 
pluralism.  This view rejects the claim that one moral value prevails over all 
others (e.g., autonomy over equality).
 
18  The normative pluralist denies that 
there is any one unitary normative standpoint from which all possible 
different moral values, which one might think of as “good-transmitters,” 
might themselves be evaluated.  There is a plurality of good-transmitters, or 
value-bearers, but only one foundational good that they all bear.19
The final rung in the ladder of value pluralism is decision proceduralism.  
This view distinguishes between criteria of right action and decision 
procedures.
  Thus, 
one may think that aggregate well-being is the foundational intrinsic good 
but also believe that there are many bearers of well-being. 
20  According to this view, which is held mainly by 
consequentialists, criteria of right action, like utility, are not intended to 
serve as decision procedures.21
Finally, it is important that we be clear about distinguishing between a 
term that applies to a group of values and a term meant to suggest only one 
unitary value.  The former meaning is consistent with pluralism, whereas 
  Rather, they claim that utility or other such 
consequentialist end is only a standard of what is morally right.  An agent 
need not be able to calculate in advance whether all of the conditions 
necessary for the right action have been met.  One could be a value monist 
in every other way but with respect to decisional procedures, choosing 
whichever one is most advantageous.  This is thus the least demanding form 
of pluralism. 
 
 14. See id. § 1.1. 
 15. See MOORE, supra note 8, at 6–16. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right and the Good, 94 J. PHIL. 273, 275–76 (1997). 
 18. See Mason, supra note 5, § 1.1. 
 19. This does not preclude the possibility that goodness itself might be foundational, or a 
priori, meaning that a moral theorist could combine foundational pluralism with normative 
pluralism.  Such was the case with G.E. Moore.  Moore thought that although bearers of 
value possessed the same foundational value, they were plural with respect to the amount of 
that good. See id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See R. Eugene Bales, Act-Utilitarianism:  Account of Right-Making Characteristics 
or Decision-Making Procedures?, 8 AM. PHIL. Q. 257, 261–63 (1971). 
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the latter is consistent only with monism.  This ambiguity is particularly 
relevant to property theorists today because welfarists have not been clear 
in which sense they use the term “welfare.”  Is welfare a term that covers a 
number of different values which in these theorists’ view cannot be ordered 
(meaning that welfare theorists are pluralists)?  Or do they regard welfare as 
a single unitary value, in which case they are monists?22  If the latter, then 
they are likely to face considerable difficulty when it comes to justifying 
their view that welfare is a unitary value.  This is because most (perhaps all) 
modern welfare theorists are empiricists, for whom an account of any value, 
including welfare, must be empirical in the sense of referring to phenomena 
in the natural world.23  So for them, an account of welfare that tries to 
establish welfare as a unitary value, as opposed to a group of values, must 
draw on phenomena in the natural world rather than relying on an a priori 
account of what it is.  Because, as consequentialists, they understand values, 
including welfare, in terms of goods, they must provide evidence from the 
empirical world to establish that welfare is a singular good rather than an 
agglomeration of multiple goods.  That may prove very difficult to do.  It 
seems unlikely that there is just one experience, condition, or state of affairs 
that we call welfare.  The term is just too broad to be captured by “one 
singular sensation,” to borrow a phrase.24
II.  A TAXONOMY OF SOCIAL OBLIGATION THEORISTS 
  Upon closer inspection, welfare 
may well turn out to be a cover term for multiple values, in which case 
welfare theorists will turn out to be pluralists rather than the monists they 
are commonly supposed to be. 
With this overview, we can now consider whether the various versions of 
social obligation property theory appear to adopt a monist or pluralist stance 
on the question of values and, if pluralist, what form or level of pluralism 
they take.  This will be a representative sampling rather than an exhaustive 
survey of social obligation theorists.  I cannot possibly claim to identify all 
property theorists who might reasonably be classified under the social 
obligation label, so I leave it to them to do so themselves. 
A.  What Constitutes a Social Obligation Theorist? 
Professor M.C. Mirow has expressed the basic idea of the social 
obligation, or social function, norm in the following terms:  “‘[P]roperty 
 
 22. One view is that welfarists are foundational monists and normative pluralists by 
virtue of their commitment to preference satisfaction.  From this perspective, only one thing 
bestows value (that the agent prefers something) but many values (whatever the agent 
prefers).  On another view, welfarists are foundational monists because there is only one 
irreducible good (welfare); all other goods are merely instrumental and therefore not really 
independently goods at all. 
 23. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational 
Actors:  A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989). 
 24. EDWARD KLEBAN, One, on A CHORUS LINE (SONY MUSIC ENTM’T 1975). 
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rights should have their share of social responsibility.’”25  The key point 
about social obligation property theory is that it is a theory (or a congery of 
theories) regarding the nature of the concept of ownership.  Thus, it does 
not include any and all theories that use the idea of “the social” to expand 
the realm of the objects of ownership, including theories like Charles A. 
Reich’s “New Property.”26
One criterion that might be used concerns a theorist’s position on the 
right to exclude.
  Nor does it include every theory of ownership 
that recognizes that property rights are not absolute.  Such a criterion would 
screen out practically no modern legal theory of ownership, including 
libertarian and welfarist theories. 
27  As Jane Baron has pointed out, “Exclusion 
is . . . currently perceived as the central fault line in property law and 
theory.”28  Over the past several years, information-cost theorists, notably 
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, have argued that the right to exclude is at 
the core of ownership, perhaps even its sine qua non.29  Social obligation 
theorists, although by no means denying the importance of the right to 
exclude, view ownership’s core as much more complex than the 
information-cost theorists acknowledge.30
In large measure these opposing views about the right to exclude stem 
from more basic views regarding the obligations of ownership.  
Exclusionary theorists view the right to exclude capaciously because they 
regard the obligations of ownership so minimally.  Property owners are 
rights-holders first and foremost; obligations are, with some few exceptions, 
assigned to non-owners.  Social obligation theorists do not reverse this 
equation so much as they balance it.  Of course property owners are rights-
holders, but they are also duty-holders, and often more than minimally so. 
  Indeed, they resist the entire 
imagery of core-and-periphery. 
Part and parcel with this emphasis on the obligations of ownership is 
another characteristic of social obligation theory.  These theorists repeatedly 
stress social vision as the foundation of any property system.31
 
 25. M.C. Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property:  Duguit, Hayem, and Others, 
22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 191, 192 (2010) (quoting UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY 
LAW:  A COMPARATIVE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION 31 (2000)). 
  
Specifically, they argue that a main function of property is to structure 
social relations and that a legal property system must therefore have a moral 
vision of what type of social relationships it seeks to foster.  Normatively, 
they believe that a property system should seek to nurture social 
 26. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also Mirow, 
supra note 25, at 218. 
 27. See Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 
919 (2010). 
 28. Id. at 919. 
 29. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 
737–39 (1998); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & 
MARY L. REV., 1849, 1857, 1861–62 (2007). 
 30. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Complex Core of Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1063 (2009). 
 31. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 
94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 757 (2009). 
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relationships of equal respect and dignity, relationships of fairness and non-
domination.  For them, it is not enough that a property system is clear, 
formal, and well structured.  Those are important characteristics, to be sure, 
but they are not enough in the eyes of social obligation theorists.  To these 
theorists, the evaluation of a property system must include a moral 
dimension, and the morally optimal property system seeks more than formal 
rules that delineate well-defined and transparent boundaries between 
owners and non-owners.  It cares about the character of the social 
relationships that those rules and other legal norms help structure and 
nurture. 
B.  Four Representative Social Obligation Theorists:  Monist or Pluralist? 
Taken together, the views of the four social obligation theorists I 
consider in this section cover all of the main points made in the social 
obligation literature.  The choice of two of the four names—Joseph William 
Singer and Jedediah Purdy—will be relatively uncontroversial.  Jane Baron 
included both of them in her study of progressive property theorists whose 
views she contrasted with those of information-cost theorists.32  The other 
two require a bit of explanation.  I include Hanoch Dagan for several 
reasons.  Not the least of these reasons is the fact that he considers himself a 
social obligation theorist.  His work has consistently and explicitly stressed 
the social responsibility dimension of property, and his general property 
theory, although departing in some respects from some social obligation 
theorists, is still closely aligned with theirs.  The final scholar in the group 
is Margaret Jane Radin.  The selection of Radin is probably the most 
surprising among the four, but there are good reasons for counting her, at 
least in her earlier incarnation33 as a social obligation theorist.  Her 
personhood theory of property had strong implications for the social 
obligations of owners, and Radin herself developed some of these 
implications in influential articles.34
In this part, I examine these four theorists’ views, focusing on the 
question of whether they are value monists or value pluralists.  In some 
cases their positions on that question are quite clear.  In others, they are not, 
and I have done my best to distill from their work readings that are faithful 
to the scholars’ views. 
 
 
 32. See Baron, supra note 27, at 924 n.12. 
 33. Since her well-known property work developing a personhood theory of property, 
Radin has moved away from property to concentrate on intellectual property and contracts. 
 34. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in MARKETS AND 
JUSTICE:  NOMOS XXXI, at 165 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989); 
Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property:  Cross Currents in the 
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667 (1988). 
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1.  Hanoch Dagan 
On the monism–pluralism question, Hanoch Dagan’s views are perhaps 
the clearest of the four.  Without doubt, Dagan is a value pluralist.35  He 
says so explicitly himself, and his reasons for saying so are well grounded.  
In a recent book36 and several articles37
Consistent with his overall political commitment to liberalism, Dagan 
argues that value pluralism can and should serve a freedom-enhancing 
function.  It can do so by “facilitat[ing], within limits, the coexistence of a 
variety of social spheres that embody different modes of valuation.”
 he consistently and clearly argues 
that property law reflects commitments to more than one value and that 
these multiple values are irreducibly plural. 
38  
Property law in fact does exactly that, he argues.  In Dagan’s view, law’s 
response to this multiplicity mirrors social understandings, especially 
perceptions of what ownership involves.  This observation leads Dagan to 
develop a version of what he calls “structural pluralism.”39
[P]roperty is an umbrella for a set of institutions [bearing a mutual family 
resemblance], serving a pluralistic set of liberal values:  autonomy, utility, 
labor, personhood, community, and distributive justice.  Property law, at 
least at its best, tailors different configurations of entitlements to different 
property institutions, with each such institution designed to match the 
specific balance between property values best suited to its characteristic 
social setting.
  He summarizes 
this theory in the following excerpt: 
40
Structural pluralism has two dimensions, or axes.  Dagan states that 
“there are dramatic differences between meanings of ownership in different 
social contexts and with respect to different resources.”
 
41  Certain values 
can and should dominate certain areas of social activity and their attendant 
legal institutions.  So, Dagan suggests, negative liberty should ordinarily be 
dominant with respect to those areas in which fee simple ownership of land 
is involved (commercial real estate transactions would be a good 
example).42
 
 35. Dagan is not clear whether in endorsing value pluralism, he means moral pluralism 
or political pluralism.  The term “value pluralism” is commonly used in connection with 
both, but it is important to distinguish between them.  Political pluralism, which is associated 
with political liberalism, is concerned with the question of what sorts of restrictions the state 
may legitimately impose upon the individual’s freedom, given the fundamental differences 
among values that people reasonably hold.  Perhaps the best known exemplar of political 
pluralism was Isaiah Berlin, whose defenses of political liberalism and a strong version of 
political pluralism were closely linked. See Mason, supra note 
  In the sphere of marital life, however, values of community 
5, § 4.4.  Political pluralism is 
not the concern addressed in this Article. 
 36. HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY:  VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011). 
 37. E.g., Dagan, supra note 4; Hanoch Dagan, Remedies, Rights, and Properties, 4 J. 
TORT L., no. 1, 2011, at 1. 
 38. DAGAN, supra note 36, at 72 (footnote omitted). 
 39. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 4, at 10. 
 40. Id. at 4. 
 41. DAGAN, supra note 36, at 72. 
 42. See Dagan, supra note 4, at 3. 
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and sharing, rather than personal liberty, should be paramount.43  In yet 
other domains (Dagan gives the example of patents), utilitarian welfare 
maximization is and should be the dominant value.44
The scheme of structural pluralism has a second axis, looking at the type 
of asset involved as well as the sphere of social activity.
 
45
Part of Dagan’s argument favoring pluralism as a normative concept is 
that pluralism enhances individual freedom.
  So, although 
development of commercial real estate ordinarily should be governed by the 
linked values of autonomy and liberty, residential real estate may be a 
different matter.  In common interest communities, for example, autonomy, 
which lies at the heart of the right to exclude, gives way, at least to some 
extent and for certain purposes, to values of cooperative behavior.  In 
residential tenancies and with respect to highly personal assets, the 
impersonal values of the market should take a back seat to values of 
personal identity. 
46  His argument closely 
follows Joseph Raz’s theory of value pluralism.  In Raz’s view, “[I]f 
autonomy is an ideal then we are committed to such a view of morality:  
valuing autonomy leads to the endorsement of moral pluralism.”47  Raz 
argues that we exercise autonomy by making choices and that we can make 
choices in a meaningful sense only if there are a variety of options from 
which to choose.48  Further, for the choices to be meaningful, the available 
options must differ from each other, differ in ways that may affect rational 
choice.  Moreover, the options must be morally acceptable.  “There are, in 
other words,” Raz says, “more valuable options than can be chosen, and 
they must be significantly different or else the requirements of variety 
which is a precondition of the adequacy of options will not be met.”49  In 
Raz’s view then, autonomy presupposes the existence of multiple 
conflicting values and the necessity of choosing among them.50  This is the 
understanding of autonomy that underlies Dagan’s argument of value 
pluralism.51
Dagan only briefly discusses incommensurability of values and the 
question of rational choice among incommensurable values.  He accepts the 
incommensurability of plural values, although it is not clear whether he 
considers incommensurability an inherent byproduct of plurality, and 
defines incommensurable values as “‘relevant goods [that] cannot be 
aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered 
 
 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 26. 
 46. See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 36, at 72; Dagan, supra note 37, at 28. 
 47. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 399 (1986). 
 48. See id. at 398. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See Dagan, supra note 4, at 11–12.  It appears, although it is not clear, that Dagan 
endorses normative rather than foundational pluralism, based on a commitment to individual 
autonomy. See id. at 12.  As Dagan observes, however, the difference between the two 
versions of pluralism is not significant for his purposes because both versions impliedly 
commit the law to the coexistence of a variety of multiple different value options. See id. 
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judgments about how these goods are best characterized.’”52  He follows 
Elizabeth Anderson’s view regarding the possibility of rational choice 
among incommensurable values, which we shall discuss in detail in Part III.  
Briefly, however, Anderson argues that although there is no available 
metric for making global overall comparative judgments of value, local 
comparisons of value can be and are rationally made.  These comparative 
evaluations are what Anderson calls “goodness-of-a-kind” judgments.53  
Such judgments are impersonal choices made in the context of local 
practices and rely solely on “values internal to and constitutive of the 
practice,”54 rather than external or global values.  Anderson gives as 
examples judgments about the performances of athletes (e.g., the scoring 
system used in international gymnastics competition).55
It is important to emphasize that Dagan’s primary concern is with a 
certain form of pluralism—“structural pluralism”—in private law.
  Such judgments 
are not expressions of mere preferences or the results of personal standards, 
nor do they consider values external to the object’s contribution to its 
contextual practice.  So, judgments about acting take into account 
considerations such as subtlety of character portrayal but not how much the 
actor is a box office draw.  Choices among incommensurable goods can be 
and are pragmatic and contextual, adapting to the conditions and standards 
of the local practices involved in the immediate setting. 
56  
Certain values and their attendant legal norms should, and to some extent, 
Dagan believes, do dominate in certain realms of social life and those legal 
institutions that facilitate or regulate activity within each of those realms but 
not in others.  Normatively, “law should facilitate (within limits) the co-
existence of various social spheres embodying different modes of 
valuation.”57  Moreover, lawgivers should be obliged to create and facilitate 
different—and sufficiently diverse—types of institutions, each 
incorporating a different value or different balance of values.58
2.  Joseph Singer 
  One might 
then call this form of pluralism applied pluralism, applying as it does 
different elements of moral theory to the legal norms and institutions of 
private law. 
Although somewhat less explicit in his property scholarship about his 
stance on the issue than Hanoch Dagan, it seems clear that Joseph Singer, 
like Dagan, is a value pluralist.59
 
 52. Id. at 11 n.36 (quoting Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 (1994)). 
  To demonstrate the inevitable role of 
 53. ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 49 (1993). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Dagan, supra note 4, at 13. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. In more recent general (i.e., not property-specific) writing, Singer, together with 
Martha Minow, has unambiguously endorsed value pluralism. See Martha Minow & Joseph 
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moral values in legal disputes and legal decision making, Singer has 
consistently emphasized that property disputes seldom, if ever, can be 
decided on the basis of legal concepts such as ownership alone.60  Such 
concepts, he has forcefully argued, have no single clear meaning that can be 
used to settle disputes.  Rather, underlying such concepts are internal 
tensions which allow competing disputants to use the concepts for opposing 
purposes.61
Singer stresses the social dimension of property rights and property 
norms.  He states that “[j]udging whether a property right is justified 
requires us to consider the ways in which the recognition of legal rights in 
property structures social relations.”
 
62  This point is important for Singer’s 
theory because Singer ultimately argues that in resolving value conflicts 
that property disputes implicate courts must have some underlying social 
vision.  Courts must, that is, decide what type of society they wish to 
promote.  In structuring property rights, Singer contends, courts must 
choose between alternative forms of social life.63  These alternative types of 
society range from one in which factory owners are free to spew pollutants 
onto neighboring properties with impunity and a landowner is free to use 
his land as a pig farm that emits obnoxious odors that make his neighbors 
sick, to a society in which property owners owe obligations to non-owners 
requiring owners, for example, to share their wealth to enable others to 
become owners themselves.64
Singer denies that property has any single, clear, fixed meaning.  It has 
multiple meanings because it derives its meaning from certain underlying 
moral values.  Singer states that property “is defined not by reference to a 
fixed conception but by reference to human values.”
 
65  Moreover, like 
Dagan, he states that the values underlying property rights and property law 
are “various and incommensurable.”66  A non-exclusive list of the moral 
values that Singer associates with property includes the following:  fairness, 
economic efficiency, social welfare, and social justice.67  Moreover, 
throughout his discussion of property, he identifies individual autonomy–
liberty, personal security, and human dignity as values that property rights 
implicate.68
 
William Singer, In Favor of Foxes:  Pluralism as Fact and Aid to the Pursuit of Justice, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 903, 903 (2010). 
 
 60. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT:  THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY 25–28 
(2000). 
 61. See id. at 19–55. 
 62. Id. at 14. 
 63. See id. at 18. 
 64. See id. at 17–18. 
 65. Id. at 37.  Singer has frequently quoted this line from the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s opinion in State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971):  “Property rights serve 
human values.  They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it.” See SINGER, supra 
note 60, at 37; JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD 1 (2000). 
 66. See SINGER, supra note 60, at 38. 
 67. See id. at 31. 
 68. See id. at 20, 31, 63, 68. 
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Like Dagan, Singer sees a kind of order to the role that these values play 
in property law.  Unlike Dagan’s order, though, the order that Singer 
identifies does not assign different values to different spheres of social life 
or to different assets.  Moreover, Singer, unlike Dagan, attaches no special 
significance to property institutions as bearers of moral values.  Rather, 
Singer sees property values in paradoxical relationships.  He emphasizes 
what he calls the “[p]aradoxes of [p]roperty.”69  So, to cite an example that 
Singer uses,70 suppose that X firm begins withdrawing water from natural 
aquifers that lay under its land and that of its neighbors.  It sells the water to 
other firms which sell bottled water.  As the demand for bottled water 
increases, X substantially increases the amount of water it withdraws.  X’s 
neighboring property owners begin to complain because they depend on the 
aquifer to support the surface of their land.  They argue that if X keeps 
withdrawing so much water, their homes will eventually collapse into the 
earth.  They contend that although it was generally legal for X to access 
underground water from its land, X cannot exercise its right in a manner 
that destroys its neighbors’ property.71
Singer makes several points from this example.  First, the conflict cannot 
be resolved on the basis of an abstract commitment to strong property rights 
or individual liberty, the moral value underlying strong legal rights in 
property.
 
72  Credible arguments based on property rights (or liberty) alone 
can be made in support of both sides.  X can plausibly argue, of course, that 
land owners should be free to use their land as they see fit and that this 
property right includes the right to freely exploit natural resources that they 
can access directly beneath their land.  Their exercise of this right, they 
continue, in no way encroaches upon any property right of their neighbors, 
who are free to do the same.  By the same token, the neighbors can argue 
that X has unduly interfered with their property rights, causing direct and 
serious physical injury to their land by removing the support for the land.  
In this situation, then, an abstract commitment to strong property rights 
supports both of two opposing values—freedom of use and security from 
harm.73
Second, Singer uses this example to argue that property conflicts often 
cannot be resolved on the basis of fixed rules alone.  Disputes such as the 
example can be decided only through “the exercise of judgment and the 
application of social norms.”
 
74
The third point Singer wishes to establish from this example is that not 
only are values implicit in property concepts and norms, they are also 
  Singer accepts that courts may develop 
general rules to adjudicate particular categories of cases.  Even then, 
however, values underlie such rules, so value choices must be made. 
 
 69. See id. at 19. 
 70. See id. at 19–39. 
 71. The example is drawn from Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-Southwest 
Industries, 576 S.W.2d 21, 22–23 (Tex. 1978). 
 72. See SINGER, supra note 60, at 20–22. 
 73. See id. at 21. 
 74. Id. at 37. 
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diverse and incommensurable.75  Singer asks, “How do we compare the 
value of freedom and the value of security, and choose one over the 
other?”76  If such value choices seem impossible to make in the abstract, 
they often are no more easily made in a contextual fashion.  In the context 
of disputes like that involving X firm’s claimed right to use underground 
water, freedom and security support both sides’ positions.  The same can be 
said, Singer argues, from a welfarist perspective.  Singer provides no 
solution to this dilemma but simply wishes to point out to us that the 
protection of property rights forces choices that are difficult, even painful.77
3.  Jedediah Purdy 
 
The first question to ask about Jedediah Purdy is whether he is a social 
obligation theorist at all.  I believe he is, although not nearly as obviously 
so as either Hanoch Dagan or Joseph Singer.  As Jane Baron observes,78 
much of Purdy’s work reflects progressive themes, and at least one other 
social obligation theorist has identified him as a fellow progressive.79  It is 
easy to misunderstand the normative message of Purdy’s property work 
because he labels his theory a “freedom-promoting approach.”80  Moreover, 
his recent book, The Meaning of Property,81 explicitly draws its inspiration 
from Adam Smith, leading one reviewer to characterize the book’s 
argument as “a classic, liberal view of private property in which property 
arises out of and helps foster a society in which individuals can enjoy 
freedom and can flourish.”82  The reviewer goes on to describe the book as 
“situating [Purdy] in the category of those who largely endorse atomistic, 
contractarian social views and who see individual freedom as the ‘single 
master value.’”83  I read Purdy differently in two respects.  First, I do not 
read his work, including The Meaning of Property, to endorse an 
“atomistic, contractarian social view[].”  Second, although he does state that 
freedom is “a single master value,”84
Purdy is no atomist.  To the contrary, he repeatedly emphasizes “the fact 
that we need one another [and] are mostly powerless without one 
 I interpret his approach to property as 
pluralistic rather than as a commitment by him to value monism. 
 
 75. See id. at 38. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. at 39. 
 78. See Baron, supra note 27, at 924 n.12. 
 79. See Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates:  Property Law in a Free and 
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1047 (2009). 
 80. See Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property:  A Renewed 
Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005) [hereinafter Purdy, A Freedom-
Promoting Approach]; Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources:  Recruitment and Reciprocity 
in the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047 (2007) [hereinafter 
Purdy, People as Resources]. 
 81. JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY:  FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE 
LEGAL IMAGINATION (2010). 
 82. Eric T. Freyfogle, Book Review, 29 LAW & HIST. REV. 327, 327 (2011) (reviewing 
PURDY, supra note 81). 
 83. Id. 
 84. PURDY, supra note 81, at 4. 
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another.”85  While he embraces positive liberty as a value, at the same time 
he recognizes and endorses the negative version of liberty that is at the heart 
of classical liberalism.  The problem for property and society more broadly, 
Purdy says, is how to somehow reconcile these two dimensions of freedom 
in a non-coercive polity.  In the two great metaphors of property theory, the 
dilemma is how to reconcile the Aristotelian vision of humans as inherently 
interdependent and social with the Lockean vision of the individual as 
inherently self-sovereign.86
Purdy reveals his commitment to pluralism as quickly as he embraces 
freedom as a value.  In the introduction to his book he writes, “Freedom is 
itself a plural value, of course, and locating its plurality within property 
thought is a major part of my aim.”
 
87  Can this statement be reconciled with 
the statement immediately preceding it, in which he declares freedom a 
“single master value”?  The latter statement, of course, appears to commit 
Purdy to value monism.  But despite his confusing statement that freedom is 
a single master value, Purdy in fact treats it as plural.  He analyzes freedom 
as multi-dimensional, with each dimension requiring normative pursuit of a 
separate value.  These values are:  reciprocity, responsibility, and self-
realization.88  In the economic sphere, Purdy’s immediate concern, 
reciprocity means that all participants have a range of alternatives, enabling 
them to bargain with each other on equal terms.89  Responsibility, Purdy 
argues, requires that “the role of arbitrary fortune in producing inequality 
(which implies nonreciprocity) should be as small as possible.”90  In this 
context Purdy means personal responsibility rather than social 
responsibility, although he by no means sees the two as mutually exclusive.  
Finally, self-realization requires full recognition of the human condition of 
interdependence.91  We need each other, Purdy observes, not merely to 
survive but to prosper and, beyond that, to realize ourselves.92
Purdy is a normative pluralist, but not a foundational pluralist.  As a 
foundational monist Purdy believes, or appears to believe, that there is one 
property of goodness—individual freedom.  As a normative pluralist, 
however, he recognizes that there are multiple bearers of that value,
 
93
 
 85. Id. at 111. 
 
including the three that we just considered. 
 86. Id. at 111–12. 
 87. Id. at 4. 
 88. See id. at 112. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 113. 
 92. See id. 
 93. I use the term “bearer of value” broadly here to include, for instance, institutions 
(including legal institutions) and their effects on values like equality.  The term also includes 
objects that agents may potentially choose in the future (where to attend law school) and 
situations over which agents have no control (a setting sun).  Bearers of value such as these 
are valuable because of the abstract value(s) they realize or display. See Nien-hê Hsieh, 
Incommensurable Values, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (July 23, 2007), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-incommensurable/. 
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It is clear from Purdy’s other writings that he recognizes other goods.  
Indeed, reading his book together with his other legal scholarship, it is not 
clear that he is a foundational monist at all.  In a recent essay, for example, 
Purdy expresses a commitment to interpersonal equality as a value that is 
internal to ownership itself and that constrains the bounds of what owners 
are free to own.94  The same value—interpersonal equality—also underlies 
constraints on the owner’s right to exclude, Purdy argues.  Discussing the 
famous case of State v. Shack, for example, Purdy suggests that “the most 
illuminating way to understand this case is as part of a broader obligation, 
instinct in ownership, to honor human equality.”95  Purdy makes it clear, 
though, that the conception of equality he has in mind is not one that 
involves, at least not as a matter of logical entailment, a commitment to 
distributive justice, but rather to access to markets.96  In this respect, then, 
equality as a good is, in Purdy’s treatment, another aspect of the basic good 
of individual freedom to which he committed himself in his book.  Equality 
as access to markets is part of what Purdy means by “recruitment” and 
“reciprocity”—the processes through which individuals in market societies 
participate in the multiple practices that constitute an economy— 
employment, production, consumption, and so on.  Within such a society, 
Purdy tells us, freedom just means that individuals are enabled to 
participate in these practices on roughly equal terms with all others.  
Systems of subordination and repression have been wiped away, and 
individuals participate in various market practices on equal footing—as free 
and autonomous moral agents.97
Purdy does not discuss the problems of incommensurability or rational 
choice among incommensurable values.  Of course, if he is indeed a 
foundational monist, there is no reason for him to do so.  The multiple 
normative goods that he discusses—recruitment, reciprocity, self-
realization, and equality—are all aspects of the same master good, 
individual freedom.  So, there is no occasion for irreducible conflicts among 
competing values in Purdy’s property theory, unlike the theories of both 
Dagan and Singer. 
 
4.  Margaret Jane Radin 
Initially, it may seem odd to classify Margaret Jane Radin as a social 
obligation theorist at all.  At first glance, her personhood theory does not 
seem resonant of a social obligation norm.  To the contrary, as critics have 
noted, it seems individualistic,98 at least as it was first set forth.99
 
 94. See Jedediah Purdy, A Few Questions About the Social-Obligation Norm, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 949, 950 (2009); see also Purdy, People as Resources, supra note 
  Its 
80. 
 95. Purdy, supra note 94, at 951. 
 96. See id. at 952. 
 97. See Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach, supra note 80, at 1297 (advocating his 
“freedom-promoting approach” to property, which “expand[s] people’s set of viable choices 
and replace[s] relations of domination and subordination with reciprocity”). 
 98. See generally Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism:  A Critique of Radin’s 
Theory of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347 (1993).  Radin herself 
acknowledges that her personhood argument sometimes has an individualistic cast. See 
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concern is with the role that property plays in the proper development of the 
self rather than what obligations owners may owe to others by virtue of 
their ownership.  On one reading, the theory does not seem relational, and 
in this respect it significantly departs from G.W.F. Hegel’s personality 
theory, which provided the inspiration for Radin’s approach.  Like Radin, 
Hegel was concerned with the development of the personality, but unlike 
Radin, the development of personality is a decidedly communal matter for 
Hegel. 
Radin’s later work reveals, however, that her personhood theory in fact 
does have social obligation implications.  Her theory recognizes that under 
some circumstances some owners owe obligations to persons with whom 
they have some special kind of relationship.  In an article examining the 
normative justifiability of residential rent control from a personhood 
perspective, for example, Radin suggests that rent control may justifiably 
lower some tenants’ rents at the landlords’ expense.100  In effect this 
amounts to recognition of an obligation that landlords owe to the tenants 
with whom they already have a landlord-tenant relationship.  This 
obligation is based on what Radin calls “the intuitive appeal for preserving 
the tenant’s [established] home.”101  That “intuitive appeal” apparently is 
based on Radin’s view that the resident tenant’s interest is one that is 
“justifiably self-invested, so that [the tenant’s] individuality and selfhood 
become intertwined with” her rental unit.102
Recognition of a social obligation of ownership can also be gleaned from 
Radin’s discussion of land use restrictions.  Radin points out that residential 
communities, either through zoning measures or restrictive covenants, often 
create their own social environments by excluding certain kinds of 
people.
  The tenant’s landlord, Radin 
implicitly suggests, owes the tenant an obligation to support this 
personhood interest, even at the expense of sacrificing profits that the 
landlord would otherwise gain by charging a market-clearing price. 
103  She argues that although one cannot judge in the abstract 
whether such forms of community creation are good or bad, these 
restrictions are bad “if those in the main stream of American culture and 
economic life, who are not having difficulty living out their culture and 
beliefs, create monolithic exclusions that make it impossible for minorities 
and dissenters to form communities and live out their alternative 
visions.”104  “[T]here are moral limitations on servitudes,” Radin states.105
 
Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 350 (1986), reprinted 
in MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 72, 86 (1993). 
  
In effect, Radin recognizes that owners in these circumstances owe 
obligations to persons who would otherwise be excluded by their 
 99. See Radin, supra note 1. 
 100. RADIN, supra note 98, at 74–75. 
 101. Id. at 81. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 
757 (1986). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 758. 
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community-creating restrictions to avoid actions that would undermine the 
others’ opportunities to flourish and to experience a well-lived life. 
Radin’s personhood theory appears to be monistic.  It is true that she 
does not present the personhood theory as a complete theory of property 
and that she recognizes that other values, including efficiency and personal 
autonomy, may have a legitimate role to play in some areas of property.  
However, the same can be said for some welfare theorists, who state that 
there may be room for values other than welfare-maximization to play, but 
who do not employ them as part of their analysis.  In one sense (a thin 
sense), these theorists are pluralists, but they, like Radin, either pay lip 
service to value pluralism or accept pluralism without facing the difficulties 
pluralism entails.106
The question is whether Radin uses personhood in the sense of a single 
fundamental value or simply a name for a group of values, in which case 
Radin’s theory would be pluralist in nature.  Does she, in other words, 
regard personhood as simple and unitary with no parts?  Radin’s views on 
personhood have shifted over time.  In her article Market-Inalienability, she 
identified three components of personhood:  freedom, identity, and 
contextuality.
 
107  However, she subsequently criticized her earlier analysis 
as based too much on “past ideal theories about personhood.”108  In its 
place she advocated a pragmatic, non-ideal theory of personhood, one that 
is rooted in “the realities of needs, capacities and circumstances that shape 
personal development in practice, in the world.”109  Her exemplar of such a 
non-ideal theory is Martha Nussbaum’s “Aristotelian essentialism.”110  
Nussbaum, both alone and in collaboration with Amartya Sen,111 has 
developed a neo-Aristotelian theory of the good that is decidedly pluralist.  
I have elsewhere explained Nussbaum’s and Sen’s capabilities approaches 
to human flourishing,112 but suffice it to say that both approaches reject the 
monist view that there exists a singular unitary fundamental moral value.  
Nussbaum analyzes human flourishing in terms of a list of specific 
capabilities that she argues are necessary for a person to live a life 
characterized by human dignity.113
 
 106. It is true that Radin characterizes her view of property alternatively as “evolutionary 
pluralism” and “pragmatic pluralism.” See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1904 n.208 (1987).  However, there is nothing pluralistic about the 
personhood theory itself.  That theory focuses on only one moral value—personhood, or 
self-constitution.  Thus, what is perhaps her most famous and influential piece, Property and 
Personhood, consistently and exclusively focuses on personhood.  For this reason, I treat her 
as a monist. 
  Moreover, her list of capabilities is 
provisional and open-ended, adding to its pluralist character.  In her later 
 107. Id. at 1904. 
 108. Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering Personhood, 74 OR. L. REV. 423, 425 (1995). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice:  In Defense of 
Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202 (1992). 
 111. See, e.g., THE QUALITY OF LIFE, supra note 12. 
 112. See Alexander, supra note 31, at 762–68. 
 113. See Nussbaum, supra note 110, at 222. 
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work Radin expressly endorses this list,114 thereby implying that her 
understanding of human flourishing, like Nussbaum’s, is pluralist.115  She 
characterizes her theory of the good as “complex and detailed.”116  Further, 
she states that it is, again like Nussbaum’s, open-ended and provisional.117
Radin states that Nussbaum’s “theory of the good implies a commitment 
to [value-]incommensurability.”
  
Finally, although non-relative, the theory of the good is culturally situated. 
118  Radin herself unambiguously denies 
that all values are commensurable and further states that this denial is 
central to human personhood.119  The question of incommensurability is, 
she states, directly linked with the issue of commodification:  
“Commodification . . . implies a strong form of value 
commensurability.”120  She has little to say about how to deal with the 
problem of value incommensurability and apparently considers the greater 
problem to be the refusal to acknowledge that values may sometimes be 
incommensurable.  As to the latter, she states that “by and 
large . . . philosophical argument, such as it is, cannot force those who are 
committed to commensurability to change their minds.”121  She continues, 
“There aren’t any knock-down logical arguments that compel people to 
recognize incommensurability.”122
III.  PLURALISM, INCOMMENSURABILITY, AND RATIONAL CHOICE 
  She does not seem much interested in 
the question and so does not pursue the matter. 
A.  Weaknesses of Value Monism:  Rational Preference Theory 
as an Example 
A main, perhaps the main, objection to value monism is that it is 
implausibly reductive.  Monists attempt to reduce all moral goods to some 
single irreducible evaluative standpoint, such as pleasure or desire.  This 
attempt simply does not square with our everyday experiences.  As 
Elizabeth Anderson states, “Our evaluative experiences, and the judgments 
based on them, are deeply pluralistic.”123
How do we respond to situations in which we are faced with multiple, 
competing goods, like equality and autonomy?  Utilitarians and welfarists 
 
 
 114. See Radin, supra note 108, at 437. 
 115. It further implies that her approach has shifted from one inspired by Hegel, as she 
claimed in Property and Personhood, to one that is neo-Aristotelian, but she does not clarify 
this shift. 
 116. Radin, supra note 108, at 437. 
 117. Id. at 438–39. 
 118. Id. at 445. 
 119. MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 9 (1996). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 122. Id.  This—whether there are “knock-down logical arguments that compel people to 
recognize” the validity of one’s claim—is an odd standard by which to determine whether a 
philosophical issue is worth engaging at all.  It is a standard that seems incompatible with 
Radin’s commitment to philosophical pragmatism, which rejects demands for all 
foundational tests for validity. 
 123. ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 1. 
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respond by weighing the competing goods against each other.  In doing so, 
they assume that the nature of the difference between the competing goods 
is simply quantitative and that, this being so, the rational solution to such 
dilemmas is to subject them to weighing by a common scale or metric, 
which, they assume, is readily available.  This is a strategy of monism, and 
it is deeply flawed. 
Many defenses of moral pluralism have been offered, most of them 
basically arguing that there is an irreducible heterogeneity of goods (e.g., 
knowledge, love, integrity, personal autonomy, etc.).  I find particularly 
attractive Elizabeth Anderson’s argument, which points out that there exists 
what I will call a pluralism of pluralisms,124
The common denominator of all versions of value pluralism is their claim 
that apparently different moral values really are different from each other 
and irreducibly so.  But values can differ from each other in more than one 
respect.  What is attractive about Anderson’s defense of pluralism is that it 
takes seriously everyday experiences, specifically, attitudes along with 
practices that reflect values.  By examining such attitudes and practices we 
can recognize the multiplicity of differences among differences in moral 
values.  Much in the way that ordinary language philosophy successfully 
draws conceptual insights from everyday expressive practices, ordinary 
attitudes and practices regarding moral values are a useful and reliable 
source of knowledge concerning moral questions.
 and I shall rely substantially on 
her theory, along with Charles Taylor’s. 
125
Looking to the evaluative attitudes and practices of everyday life, we can 
see how the differentiation of goods proceeds along multiple vectors.  One 
vector concerns the modes of valuation.
 
126  Anderson points out that we 
employ distinctive evaluative attitudes toward different goods.127
But in valuing something—persons, objects, whatever—that is, judging it 
to be good, we do not always employ standards.  Sometimes we value 
people or things intrinsically, that is, simply for who or what they are.
  This is 
saying more than that different kinds of goods are different in different 
ways.  It is saying that in our everyday practices we use different kinds of 
standards to evaluate different kinds of goods.  When I say, “Nelson 
Mandela is a good man,” I don’t mean “good” in the same sense as when I 
say, “This cake is good.”  The standards I use in valuing Nelson Mandela 
and cake are quite distinct and resist reduction to any single or unitary 
standard.  We have, in other words, a plurality of evaluative attitudes and 
standards in addition to a plurality of goods. 
128
 
 124. See id. at 14. 
  
 125. This approach, relying as it does on everyday attitudes and practices, is not an 
intuitive approach.  It differs from an intuitive approach in at least two respects:  first, an 
intuitive approach does not identify the source of our intuitions; second, this method is more 
social than the intuitional method insofar as it concerns societal rather than individual 
attitudes and practices. 
 126. See ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 8–11. 
 127. See id. at 8–16. 
 128. Goods may be valued either intrinsically, i.e., for who or what they are, or 
instrumentally, i.e., for what they can obtain or lead to. 
2011] PLURALISM AND PROPERTY 1037 
Most parents value their children this way.  This is partly what it means to 
say that we love our children unconditionally.  But at other times we value 
things or persons because they meet a certain preexisting standard that we 
have.  I value my favorite bakery’s cake because it meets a certain standard 
of taste that I use in judging cakes, not because I value cakes intrinsically. 
These two different ways of valuing things leads Anderson to observe 
that there are two conceptions of good.  Although these two conceptions 
overlap with each other, they do not coincide perfectly.  The broader sense 
is captured when we say that something is good simply when it is 
appropriately valued.129  The second, narrower conception of good means 
that a person or thing is good because it merits being valued by virtue of 
meeting certain preexisting standards of value that we have.130
As Anderson explains, these two different conceptions of good lead to 
two different conceptions of a plurality of goods.  One conception is the 
idea that we value goods in different ways, ways that are irreducibly 
different.
 
131  The second form of pluralism concerns evaluative 
standards.132
Another vector of differentiation concerns the social dimension of 
valuation.
  There exists an irreducible plurality of evaluative standards 
according to which we judge whether something is good or not.  The 
standard(s) I use in judging whether or not a cake is good are irreducibly 
different than the evaluative norms that lead me to declare a Mahler 
symphony good. 
133  As Anderson notes, “[I]ndividuals are not self-sufficient in 
their capacity to value things in different ways.”134  The different ways in 
which we value things emerge from social settings which sustain the 
different modes of valuation.  Anderson states, “To care about something in 
a distinctive way, one must participate in a social practice of valuation 
governed by norms for its sensible expression.”135
A final vector of differentiation of goods involves the relationship 
between goods and self-image.
  For example, the 
appropriate mode of expressing valuation of symphonic music in the United 
States is applause, i.e., clapping one’s hands together, and this distinct 
mode is learned in a social setting.  The appropriate mode of expressing 
valuation of an oral presentation of a scholarly paper at a university setting 
in Germany is rapping one’s fingers or knuckles on the table, a different 
mode that is also learned in a social setting. 
136
 
 129. See ANDERSON, supra note 
  Our self-perceptions, of what kind of 
persons we are and what we would like to be, inform our perceptions of 
values.  My desire to be an excellent scholar implicitly means that I value 
certain goods, goods which I strive to attain—to be clear, insightful, careful, 
53, at 2. 
 130. See id. at 4. 
 131. See id. at 4–5. 
 132. See id. 
 133. See id. at 11–16. 
 134. Id. at 11–12. 
 135. Id. at 12. 
 136. See id. at 5–8. 
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and honest in my work.  It means, moreover, that I have become 
acculturated in the norms of a particular community that has educated me 
about what goods are valued in the relevant social group of scholars of 
which I am a member. 
Monism attempts to bypass these several levels of differences among 
goods by reducing them all to one fundamental value.  This attempt ignores 
the evaluative attitudes and practices of everyday life, which inform us that 
we use multiple and fundamentally diverse standards when coming to value 
the variety of goods that we encounter in the diverse realms of our lives.  It 
also denies the dependency of our evaluative standards on the particularity 
and diversity of social settings in which we deploy those standards.  It 
implausibly supposes that one unitary fundamental value cuts across all 
social and cultural contexts. 
As Anderson suggests, one way to test monist theories against pluralist 
theories is through ordinary experience.137
The version of monist value theory that is most common in property 
scholarship (and perhaps most common generally) is rational desire (or 
preference) theory, which lies at the heart of modern welfarism.  Rational 
desire theory asserts that what is good for a person, what that person values, 
is what she or he rationally prefers.
  Can the monist theory in 
question satisfactorily account for the entire range of ordinary evaluative 
experience?  This means whether the theory can account for the variety of 
standards we ordinarily deploy when valuing people, things, and so on, in 
different spheres of social life.  Can it account for all of the many goods, 
and the many kinds of goods, as we experience them, that we value in 
ordinary life?  Elaborating on this last point, do those things that are valued 
as good by the theory match up with just those things that our experience 
gives us good reasons to value? 
138  Welfare economics, which posits a 
cruder version of this theory,139
Although the pluralist theory and rational desire theory agree in 
identifying the good with the subject of a person’s positive evaluations in 
everyday life, they part company from that point on.  The first point of 
difference concerns rational desire theory’s identification of the good with 
preferences.  Rational desire theory does not account for all goods.  It is not 
so much wrong as it is incomplete.
 consider such preferences to be the actual 
preferences a person has as they are revealed through actual behavior.  Let 
us compare the more sophisticated rational desire understanding of the good 
with the pluralist theory just described. 
140
 
 137. See id. at 118–19. 
  Objects of desire are aims that we 
wish to bring about or to obtain.  Not everything that people value is 
 138. See generally RICHARD BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT (1979). 
 139. See generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 
(2002).  Whether objectionable actual preferences, say, racist preferences, should be ignored 
or cleansed in the welfare calculus is a controversial topic among welfarists. Compare, e.g., 
JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES 20–24 (1983) (advocating elimination of improper preferences 
from welfare calculation), with KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra, at 422 (arguing that purging any 
preferences conflicts with individuals’ basic autonomy and freedom). 
 140. See ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 129–30. 
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something that we wish to bring about.  Indeed, some of the most valuable 
goods to a person are not aims at all.  A person values them intrinsically 
rather than desiring them in some motivational sense.  Think of one’s 
children, for example.  A theory of the good that defines the good 
exclusively in terms of preferences or rational desires cannot capture most 
people’s experience of valuing their children.  Some additional value 
besides preference-satisfaction, a value not reducible to preference-
satisfaction, must be at work to explain people’s positive evaluations of 
their children. 
The second respect in which value pluralism and rational desire theory 
differ is the inverse of the first point of difference.  The category of desired 
or preferred objects is over-inclusive in the sense that not all preferences are 
goods.  This is so because of the logic of preference theory, which is 
maximization of preference-satisfaction.  If maximization of preference-
satisfaction is to serve as the sole basis of the good, then we must be able to 
represent preferences in a “single, complete, transitive preference 
ordering.”141  If a person’s preferences can be represented, at least at times, 
only by multiple conflicting preference orderings, then some value other 
than preference satisfaction must be at work to determine which preferences 
indicate value.142  In fact, preferences often do conflict.  This occurs partly 
because preferences arise from multiple and diverse sources, ranging from 
rational evaluation to whim to habits and even compulsion.  One possible 
response to the problem of conflicting preferences is to identify the 
strongest preference as the authoritative one, measuring strength on the 
basis of either experienced intensity or motivational effectiveness.143
If we use motivational effectiveness as the yardstick by which to measure 
intensity of desire, we encounter other problems.  The motivational 
effectiveness measure endorses whatever desire actually leads a person to 
action, but such desires sometimes are the result of weakness of will.  By 
this standard, people who are addicted to nicotine and who are trying 
unsuccessfully to quit have stronger preferences for cigarettes than they do 
for good health.  But surely that is a misleading conclusion to draw 
regarding which preference is that person’s authoritative preference.  When 
preferences conflict, no intrinsic attribute of preference can tell us which 
preference is the authoritative index of value.  We must look to some source 
outside of preference to determine that index. 
  But 
this solution will not work.  The problem with relying on felt intensity as 
the benchmark of strength is that it is very misleading.  Often the desires 
that a person feels most intensely are compulsions or obsessions.  If we 
define rational desire on the basis of what states of affairs on reflection we 
seek to secure for ourselves, then intensely felt desires will sometimes fail 
to meet the test of a rational desire. 
 
 141. Id. at 132. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. at 136. 
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B.  The Inadequacies of Value Monism of Property Theory 
Value monism can be found in various forms throughout modern 
property theory.  Probably the best example is, as I have already indicated, 
welfarism, the value theory that is the foundation of law and economics.  
Because I have already discussed some of the problems that confront 
welfarism and its theory of value, preference satisfaction, I will briefly 
examine two other monist property theories in this section:  libertarianism 
and the neo-Hegelian personhood theory.  Two problems appear in monist 
property theories.  First, they do not maintain their monist character.  That 
is, they both tend to slide into pluralism insofar as they introduce other 
values.  Second, the preferred value of monist property theories does not 
account for all of property law but only for selected parts. 
Consider first libertarianism.  Perhaps the best known spokesperson 
celebrating individual liberty as the single foundational value grounding all 
of property law is Richard Epstein, and among his vast body of property 
writings, the best exemplar of his libertarian view is his famous book 
Takings.144  Epstein’s book has attracted more than its share of critics, and 
one of the common threads of criticism is that Epstein does not consistently 
hew to his rights-based libertarian line.  He blends libertarianism with more 
than a few doses of welfarist consequentialism.  Epstein claims, for 
example, that his theory strictly protects property as a classically liberal 
natural right.  But in explaining the foundation of this natural right, Epstein 
rejects the divine origin theory of Locke and Kant’s pure reason theory in 
favor of utility maximization.145  This move—attempting to marry 
individual liberty as the fundamental value with utilitarian or welfarist 
constraints—is characteristic of much of Epstein’s property scholarship.146
Epstein is not the only libertarian who fails to maintain a consistent 
commitment to individual liberty as the sole foundational value that does or 
ought to undergird all of property law.  Barbara Fried has recently argued 
that the same problem besets Robert Nozick’s theory of property.
 
147  Fried 
contends that in Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick actually has three 
theories, which she considers mutually exclusive—Lockean libertarian, 
utilitarian, and “anything goes, provided that citizens have some 
unspecified level of choice among legal regimes.”148  To the extent that any 
one of them predominates, Fried suggests, it is utilitarianism.149
 
 144. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985). 
  Indeed, 
Fried goes on to suggest that most deontologists have not been able to 
provide detailed solutions to everyday moral problems on the basis of their 
 145. See Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 36 
(1986); see also Margaret Jane Radin, The Consequences of Conceptualism, 41 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 239, 242 (1986). 
 146. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law:  Two Dents 
in the Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (1986); Radin, supra 
note 103.  
 147. See generally Fried, supra note 1. 
 148. Id. at 4. 
 149. Id. 
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deontological premises alone; rather, they have usually relied on assistance 
from welfarism.150
Not only do monist property theories tend to fail in their commitment to a 
single, unitary value as the foundation of property law, they also fail as 
comprehensive theories of property.  That is, they account only for limited 
parts of property law, conceding (usually implicitly) that the remainder of 
property law rests on other values.  Radin’s personhood theory illustrates 
this problem.  This limitation of Radin’s personhood theory is indicated by 
the very fact that Radin herself concedes that her neo-Hegelian theory is not 
a general theory of property.
 
151
Both Epstein’s and Radin’s efforts tell us something important about the 
moral foundation of property law.  It is too heterogeneous to be reduced to a 
single, all-encompassing moral value.  Property law’s heterogeneity has at 
least two dimensions.  Radin’s dichotomy between “personal” property and 
“fungible” property points to one dimension—the heterogeneity among 
types of assets (especially viewed in context).
  It applies only to those assets and those 
forms of social life that are (or should be) beyond the reach of the market.  
Even if we significantly reduce the market’s realm, removing from it a 
number of assets or interests that may legally be the subject of market 
exchanges under current law, we would still be left with an enormous area 
of social life and an enormous part of property law about which Radin’s 
personhood theory has nothing to say. 
152
A second dimension of heterogeneity is social context.  Here, I have in 
mind less the discrete realms of social activity (e.g., the family, the 
workplace, politics, etc.) that Walzer famously described
  As Radin wonderfully 
shows, although people experience many assets as market commodities, 
viewing them for their capacity to create wealth, they experience other 
types of assets in a fundamentally different way, reflecting a different 
valuation.  It is different not in the sense of being higher or lower but in the 
sense of being an altogether different form or dimension of valuation.  They 
value these “personal” assets for their contribution to and relationship with 
the construction of the owner’s identity. 
153 than I do the 
myriad forms and means of social interaction.  Epstein’s inability to 
maintain a single-minded commitment to individual liberty illustrates, for 
example, how the passage of time not only affects the relations between 
past and present possessors of land but also implicates other goods—
including wealth-maximization, the self-identity that accompanies long-
term possession, and so on—beyond individual liberty in disputes between 
those possessors.154
 
 150. Id. at 27–28. 
  More broadly, recent judicial applications of the public 
trust doctrine to contexts in which recreation is the use in question 
illustrates how courts have recognized the importance of goods other than 
 151. See Radin, supra note 1, at 958, 991, 1013. 
 152. See id. at 960. 
 153. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983). 
 154. See Richard A. Epstein, Past and Future:  The Temporal Dimension in the Law of 
Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 667 (1986). 
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those expressed by the right to exclude.155  These goods notably include 
friendship, sociality, and tolerance.156  Goods such as these cannot be 
reduced to mere preferences.  They are not simply objects of desire, the 
conditions of which can be specified in strictly non-evaluative terms, 
something we either have or do not have (“I just do.”).157
Hanoch Dagan has pointed out that in property theory monism takes a 
structural form as well as a value form.
  Rather, as we 
experience such goods, we recognize that in identifying them as valuable to 
us, we must employ standards that are evaluative, even emotional in nature.  
The need to use evaluative or emotional standards in identifying goods is 
one basis for distinguishing mere preferences from pluralist goods. 
158
What needs emphasis is the fact that beneath the structural multiplicity 
lies value pluralism that is both foundational and normative.
  By structural pluralism he means 
the multiplicity of realms of social activity and corresponding legal 
doctrines and institutions with attending value foundations.  Thus, with 
respect to the family home, in relations between the owner and outsiders the 
right to exclude is indeed paramount and appropriately so.  In this realm, 
the law values individual autonomy and personal security.  But in the 
context of marriage and marital property, a very different set of values 
prevails.  Here, sharing, community, and cooperation are the values that are 
normative guideposts for the law.  Individual autonomy and security are 
inappropriate as normative foundations for an intimate social relationship 
like marriage.  This institutional multiplicity can be seen in further detail as 
we look at social organizations ranging from common interest communities 
to partnerships. 
159
 
 155. See Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005); Raleigh Ave. Beach Ass’n v. 
Atlantis Beach Club, 879 A.2d 112 (N.J. 2005). 
  The 
existence of multiple social spheres each with attendant legal institutions 
and doctrines expresses the pluralism of moral values.  The various legal 
institutions and norms embody the basic moral values that are at work in the 
social spheres that the legal institutions regulate.  That the law creates such 
multiple and diverse institutions and norms is itself prima facie evidence 
that the underlying values are genuinely diverse and plural.  Moreover, even 
within the same social sphere and same attendant legal institution or set of 
institutions, there may well be multiple and diverse fundamental values that 
conflict with each other or at least are potentially in tension with each other.  
Some property institutions may express both individual autonomy and 
cooperation or sharing, for example.  In such situations we will need to 
determine whether the fundamental values are incommensurable and if so, 
whether a rational choice between them is possible.  These questions are the 
topics of the next two subsections. 
 156. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:  Custom, Commerce, and Inherently 
Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 779–80 (1986). 
 157. See ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 129. 
 158. See Dagan, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 159. See id. at 10–13. 
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C.  Incommensurability–Incomparability 
Value pluralism is often associated with the problem of 
incommensurability.160  Some theorists suppose that if values are plural 
they must be incommensurate.161  But we need to be clear about just what 
we mean by incommensurate, for there is disagreement about its 
meaning.162  One meaning is that incommensurable objects cannot be 
measured by a single common scalar metric.  In this sense it does appear 
that plural values involve incommensurability.  But others use the term 
“incommensurable” (or “incommensurate”) as being synonymous with 
incomparable.163  Strictly speaking, the two are not identical.164 
Incommensurables can be comparable.  The side and diagonal of a square 
are incommensurable but comparable.165  However, even if plurality does 
not entail incomparability, the plural (and incommensurate) moral values at 
conflict in a given situation may still be regarded as incomparable, raising 
the problem of whether rational choice between (or among) them is 
possible.166  This is the problem that critics of pluralism commonly raise, 
and it is the one I wish to address.  Hence, I will, following Joseph Raz,167
Let us define two incommensurate goods as two goods about which no 
positive value relation between them holds.  A positive value relation 
means that we can say that x is better than y, or x is less than y, or x is equal 
to y.  If we can say none of those things about the relation between x and y, 
then they are incommensurate.
 
treat incommensurability as synonymous with incomparability, which I 
think is the more serious problem. 
168  One can commensurate two or more 
values only in relation to what Ruth Chang calls a “covering value,” i.e., 
some valuable respect or consideration that they share in common.169
 
 160. For an argument that value pluralism does not necessarily involve incomparability 
qua incommensurability, see Ruth Chang, Introduction to INCOMMENSURABILITY, 
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 14–16 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997). 
  So, 
two intrinsically valuable goods such as Bach’s musical genius and Mother 
Theresa’s kindness are incommensurate because they are valuable in 
fundamentally different respects.  There is no covering value that enables 
any statement of a positive value relation between them to be made.  Where 
 161. See Michael Stocker, Abstract and Concrete Value:  Plurality, Conflict, and 
Maximization, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra 
note 160, at 196, 203. 
 162. See Chang, supra note 160, at 1. 
 163. See, e.g., RAZ, supra note 47, at 322. 
 164. Comparison does not require any single scalar metric of measurement.  One 
alternative can be better than another in a relevant sense (e.g., moral) without being a certain 
number of units better.  Items that are comparable can be ordinally ranked, i.e., ranked on a 
list, but need not be cardinally ranked, i.e., precisely ranked on the basis of a certain number 
of units of some scalar metric. See Chang, supra note 160, at 2. 
 165. Stocker, supra note 161, at 203. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 168. See Elizabeth Anderson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in 
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 160, at 90, 
90. 
 169. Chang, supra note 160, at 34. 
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there is a covering value, Elizabeth Anderson has developed a three-part 
test for incommensurability.  Sharing a covering value, multiple goods are 
still incommensurable, she suggests, if (1) they both meet the standards 
measured by some scale but do so in very different ways; (2) there are no 
great differences in the extent to which each good meets the standards in its 
own way; and (3) meeting the standards in one way is not categorically 
superior to the other way.170  Consider genius.  There are multiple ways of 
meeting the standard of genius, but none of them is categorically superior to 
the other.  Bach’s musical genius is beyond question, but it is not 
categorically superior to Shakespeare’s literary genius.  Each exhibited 
genius in the way appropriate to his own genre, which were quite different 
from each other.  Neither displayed greater genius than the other, nor can 
we say that they were roughly the same in genius.  But suppose that 
Shakespeare had developed the novel as well as written plays and sonnets.  
This imagined Shakespeare would be better than the real one, but would we 
say that he exhibited greater genius than Bach?  This would make no sense.  
The situation exhibits what Raz calls intransitivity:  Bach does not possess 
more genius than does Shakespeare, nor does the opposite hold true.171  But 
there is a third option—the imagined Shakespeare—and this option is better 
than one but not the other.  Intransitivity is the mark, Raz says, of 
incommensurability.172
Just how common is the phenomenon of incommensurability of values?  
It depends.  Values are guides for decisions or reasons for action.  In this 
respect, values implicate the question of human agency.
 
173  There are, 
broadly speaking, two schools of thought about human agency.  The crucial 
differences between the two are:  first, the rationalist considers the agent’s 
preferences as a reason for decision or action, whereas the classical school 
regards preference as an independent factor rather than a reason; second, the 
rationalist holds that incommensurabilities are relatively rare anomalies, 
whereas classicists consider value incommensurabilities far more 
common.174
The rationalist’s move of regarding preferences as reasons is highly 
problematic.  Preferences are motivations, but they are not, at least not 
necessarily, reasons.  Reasons require both information and reflection, 
qualities that preferences may or may not exhibit.  My preference for 
vanilla ice cream over chocolate is not the result of information (at least not 
much) or reflection but instinctive reaction to taste.  By considering 
preferences as reasons, rationalists cover the universe of motivations, 
thereby rendering the category of non-choice among incommensurate goods 
an empty category.  A nifty move, but unconvincing.  Unconvincing and 
unnecessary.  There is another way to approach the problem of rational 
 
 
 170. ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 55. 
 171. See RAZ, supra note 47, at 325–26. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, 
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 160, at 110, 111. 
 174. Id. 
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choice among incommensurate goods that does not require treating 
preferences as reasons.  I turn to that approach in the next section. 
One more point about preferences needs to be added.  Welfarists and 
other consequentialists sometimes try to avoid the problem of 
incommensurable goods by arguing that all preferences are complete, and 
that being the case, any two available options to someone who faces a 
choice between them are commensurable.  The preferences are complete, 
the argument goes, because in a given situation the chooser may always be 
forced to choose, hence revealing her preference.175  This argument 
succeeds by reducing preferences to choices, but that is surely a mistake.  
Choices are sometimes forced in situations in which it would be absurd to 
call the chosen option a “preference.”176
D.  Rational Choice Among Incommensurate Goods 
  Sometimes choices reflect 
preferences, but at other times, choices are just choices.  They certainly tell 
us nothing about values.  The fact that a person’s choices are complete is no 
reliable indicator of the person’s value rankings.  Hence, the preference-
maximizer cannot sidestep the problem of incommensurability. 
Are we left, then, with no alternative but to conclude that values are 
indeed irreducibly plural and thus that it is not (or at least may not be) 
possible to make a rational choice between two moral values?  Can we 
make non-arbitrary (though contestable) decisions in such situations in the 
absence of an available metric? 
I think there is an alternative, and it is one that resonates with suggestions 
that a number of other moral theorists have raised.  To introduce it, let me 
quote a passage from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in which he discusses 
epieikeia, or equity: 
[A]ll law is universal [generally], but there are some things about which it 
is not possible to speak correctly in universal terms.  Now, in [those] 
situations where it is necessary to speak in universal terms but impossible 
to do so correctly, the law takes the majority of cases, fully realizing in 
what respect it misses the mark.  The law itself is none the less correct.  
For the mistake lies neither in the law nor in the lawgiver, but in the 
nature of the case.  For such is the material of which actions are made.  So 
in a situation in which the law speaks universally, but the case at issue 
happens to fall outside the universal formula, it is correct to rectify the 
shortcoming, in other words, the omission and mistake of the lawgiver 
due to the generality of his statement. . . .  There are some things about 
which it is impossible to enact a law, so that a special decree is required.  
For where a thing is indefinite, the rule by which it is measured is also 
indefinite, as is, for example, the leaden rule used in Lesbian construction 
 
 175. See ANDERSON, supra note 53, at 58. 
 176. The choice posed in the novel by William Styron, SOPHIE’S CHOICE (1979), is a 
particularly vivid fictive example. 
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work.  Just as this rule is not rigid but shifts with the contour of the stone, 
so a decree is adapted to a given situation.177
As usual, Aristotle is highly instructive, not only about the problem of 
rules and standards but more generally about making practical decisions 
and the nature of the practical.
 
178  In this passage, of course, Aristotle is 
discussing practical reason, and practical reason is not solely concerned 
with means but with ends as well.179
In referring to “what really matters,” I mean those actions, modes of 
behavior, personal characteristics, virtues, ways of life that deeply and 
honestly express and embody the kind of life that the individual regards as 
satisfying, worthwhile, and fulfilling—in short, good.
  Aristotle reminds us that in living 
their lives individuals are able to deliberate about seemingly intractable 
choices and to evaluate what ends are important to them and why.  They do 
not do so merely by relying on their personal preferences, which they treat 
as some sort of unexamined black box.  Rather, they look inside the box 
and closely examine its contents.  Nor do they do so by engaging in some 
sort of maximizing calculation but by reflecting, oft times in a kind of semi-
conscious way, on what really matters in their lives, where “what matters” 
pertains to considerations such as how they find personal fulfillment or 
what provides meaning for their lives. 
180  What may really 
matter to some people is kindness to others, best experienced by easing 
their suffering or discomfort.  For others, what really matters may be 
something quite different—the esteem of one’s peers, perhaps, or 
unshakeable courage, and so on.  If those who consider kindness to be the 
most important good in life, or at least among the most important goods, 
reflect on what accounts for their valuation of kindness, they will come to a 
deeper level of understanding of their moral constitution.  They will realize 
that the view they hold regarding kindness as fundamental to the good life 
relates closely to certain background understandings they have, such as 
basic views of the relationship between the individual and society, the 
nature of humanity, and so on.181
 
 177. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V., ch. 10, at 1137b–1138a (Martin Ostwald 
trans., 1962).  The reference to Lesbian construction work is to its molding, which had an 
undulating curve.  The Lesbian rule was “a flexible piece of lead which was first 
accommodated to the irregular surface of a stone already laid in position, and then applied to 
other stones with the view of selecting one of them with irregularities which would fit most 
closely into those of the stone already laid.” 1 J.A. STEWART, NOTES ON THE NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE 531 (1973). 
  In deliberating about the seemingly 
intractable choices between two or more irreducible but incommensurable 
 178. The following discussion draws inspiration from essays by Charles Taylor and 
David Wiggins. See Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, 
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 160, at 170; David Wiggins, 
Incommensurability:  Four Proposals, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND 
PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 160, at 52. 
 179. See David Wiggins, Deliberation and Practical Reason, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE’S 
ETHICS 221 (Amélie Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980). 
 180. Charles Taylor refers to such actions, ways of being, and so on, as “life goods.” See 
CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF:  THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 93 (1989). 
 181. Taylor refers to these basic understandings as “constitutive good[s].” Id. at 92.  They 
are constitutive insofar as they constitute the life goods themselves. See id. at 92–95. 
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options, individuals move, often (probably usually) unconsciously, between 
these different levels of reflection about what really matters.  In doing so, 
they begin to break down what really matters, whatever it may be for them 
individually, into more finely-grained essentials, elements, threads, and 
dispositions. 
What emerges from this process, although usually not in any clearly 
articulated form, are evaluative criteria through which individuals are able 
to avoid impasses in their reflections about what really is worthwhile in life.  
They develop these criteria contextually, not in the abstract, in an all-things-
considered method where all the things that they consider are the concrete 
elements immediately at hand.  The criteria, then, may lack sufficient 
generality to permit a general ordinal ranking, let alone a cardinal ranking, 
yet the criteria are sufficiently definite and substantive to enable choices to 
be made among available options.  As the excerpt from Aristotle quoted 
above indicates, this is what it means to be “practical” and to engage in 
practical reasoning.  It cannot be distilled into any process that we can 
remotely characterize as maximization, for what really matters is not a 
unitary super-value in the end.  What really matters is complex, irreducibly 
so, and part of the point of the process of reflecting on it is to come to grips 
with its irreducible complexity. 
As Aristotle emphasizes, the nature of practical reasoning is such that no 
blanket general (or “universal,” to use the Aristotelian term) rule will be of 
use in the kind of cases we are discussing.  “There are some things about 
which it is impossible to enact a law,” he urges us to acknowledge.182  Our 
decisions, our choices between multiple incommensurable goods, are 
intensely and inevitably fact dependent.  We ourselves don’t rely on general 
rules that abstractly rank-order our values when confronted with such 
dilemmas, for such rules would fail us in these cases.  They would fail us 
for exactly the reason Aristotle identifies—because “there are some things 
about which it is not possible to speak in universal terms.”183  In such cases 
we cannot use a “rule [that] is . . . rigid but [rather one that] shifts with the 
contour of the stone.”184
To continue Aristotle’s metaphor, the stone is what really matters, and 
the contour of that stone is not always clear.  The process of reflecting on 
what really matters may reveal that it is not morally unambiguous, and in 
fact it is not even a single value when viewed in a particular context.  
Suppose that Jill is a graduate botany student doing fieldwork on local flora 
in Africa.  She accidentally discovers that an indigenous flower, previously 
known only to the indigenous tribe, has properties that allow it to be 
developed into an anti-HIV vaccine.  A significant portion of the local tribe 
is infected with HIV or suffers from full-blown AIDS.  She also learns that 
the local tribe considers the flower to be sacred and uses it in one of its 
most important religious rituals.  Jill faces a dilemma.  On the one hand, she 
 
 
 182. See Aristotle, supra note 177, at 1137b–1138a. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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could disclose (possibly for consideration, which she then might donate or 
at least share with the local tribe) the existence of the flower to a 
pharmaceutical firm already engaged in manufacturing anti-HIV vaccines, 
or she could keep the flower’s existence a secret, thereby protecting the 
sacred ritual of the indigenous tribe.  Jill consults the elders of the tribe, 
presenting them with the facts of her situation and asking for advice.  What 
course of action would be in the tribe’s best interest, she asks?  The elders 
conduct an informal plebiscite among the members of the tribe, who vote in 
favor of negotiating with a pharmaceutical firm.  But the elders reject the 
results of the plebiscite and tell Jill that she should keep the flower’s 
existence a secret.  Jill worries about the fact that the elders have rejected 
the apparent wishes of the tribe.  She is also troubled by the possibility that 
the elders, none of whom has AIDS or is infected with the HIV virus, have 
not fully taken into account the interests of those who are suffering from 
AIDS or are HIV-positive. 
What should she do?  Reflecting on her choice, Jill realizes that what she 
values most highly in her life is being kind to others.  Jill does not consider 
herself to be any sort of saint, but she does share Aristotle’s view that 
humans are social animals.  Further, she believes that interdependency is an 
inevitable aspect of the human condition.  A little further reflection about 
what exactly kindness to others means leads Jill to realize that what 
kindness to others requires is not clear in this situation.  She sees that it 
implicates at least two quite different goods, both of which matter a great 
deal to her.  The first is respect for the tribe’s autonomy and their dignity, as 
individuals and as a group.  An important aspect of this good is non-
domination—doing what she can to protect the tribe from being exposed to 
forms of outside encroachment on their autonomy that risk domination and 
loss of their way of life.  At the same time, Jill is in a position to help the 
tribe, to reduce their suffering, by giving the pharmaceutical firm access to 
the flower so that it can produce the anti-HIV vaccine, which can then be 
made available to members of the indigenous tribe, per Jill’s demand, either 
free or heavily subsidized by Jill and the firm.  Both options involve acts of 
kindness to the tribe but in very different ways.  Two different goods are at 
stake here, and they are very hard, if not impossible, to compare.  If asked 
to rank-order them according to their importance to her in the abstract, she 
could not possibly do so.  How can she possibly choose in this situation? 
Charles Taylor’s discussion of such situations is especially insightful.185  
Taylor suggests that the crucial aspect of Jill’s reasoning will not be her 
weighting of the different goods but will instead be what Taylor calls 
“complementarity.”186  Rather than balancing the different goods— 
dignity–non-domination and improvement in health care—in the sense of 
weighing them against each other, Jill will consider how both goods fit 
together as pieces of a whole life that she is creating.187
 
 185. See Taylor, supra note 
  We are always in 
the process of becoming a certain kind of human being, and we must 
178, at 178–82. 
 186. See id. at 181. 
 187. Id. at 179. 
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evaluate each choice that confronts us as a part of that ongoing process 
rather than as an isolated decision.  Precisely because our lives are an 
ongoing process that is inconstant, unpredictable, and surprising, we would 
perhaps not fit the same pieces together the same way at different points in 
our lives.  But at any given point in our lives, a point when we face the need 
to choose between two fundamentally different goods, we do have some 
sense of our lives, where we are leading our lives, and what kind of persons 
we aim to become.  It is that sense that enables us to see how the pieces fit 
together and then to decide. 
Complementarity reasoning in Jill’s case is agent-relative in nature.  That 
is, it moves away from asking what is the right choice in terms of the 
competing values in general or in the abstract to asking what is the right 
choice for the person making it (in this case, Jill).  At the same time, 
however, complementarity reasoning does not necessarily ignore the 
interests that others may have in the agent’s choice.  The agent’s own vision 
of how she wishes her life to unfold and what kind of person she sees 
herself as becoming may well lead her to take the interests of at least some 
others into account.  This is especially likely if she is responsible (and sees 
herself as such) for the well-being of certain others, ranging from close 
family members to individuals who are members of various communities or 
groups that nurture her own well-being in some clear way.  The range of 
persons whose interests the agent takes into account may be broad or 
narrow, depending upon a wide variety of factors.  The important point is 
that the agent-relative character of complementarity reasoning need not lead 
to total exclusion of others’ interests. 
There is no reason to suppose that when someone in Jill’s position is able 
to make a rational choice between incommensurable values through 
complementarity reasoning she implicitly relies upon some sort of super-
value that allows ranking of otherwise incommensurable values.  That is not 
the character of Jill’s reasoning when she considers how the multiple values 
fit together.  She does not view the values in binary, or zero sum terms, a 
situation in which she chooses one and discards the other that has been 
trumped.  Rather, they constitute pieces of the ongoing jigsaw puzzle that is 
her life—her self—and she values both pieces but must imagine how they 
can fit with the rest of the puzzle.  There is no rejection of values, no 
trumping.  There is instead fitting and refitting until a sense of 
complementarity—an understanding of the relative contributions the 
various values make in creating the kind of person she wishes to become—
is achieved.  Jill evaluates the contributions of each value by looking at 
them in their relationships with the others, not in a sense of weighing them 
against each other or ranking them (ordinally or cardinally), but in the sense 
of investigating how each value fits with the others. 
E.  Complementarity Analysis Applied to Judicial Reasoning 
Jill’s story is an example of practical reasoning in the context of personal 
morality, but does it have any relevance to political morality and to legal 
decision making?  I think it does, and the key is Aristotle’s discussion of 
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equity and its relationship to legal rules that I quoted earlier.188  In that 
passage Aristotle intends to describe the equitable judge, but he also intends 
to describe the lawful judge, the judge who realizes that legality means 
supporting the legal framework as a whole.  Acting equitably, Aristotle tells 
us, is not acting outside of or against the law.  Much to the contrary, equity 
actually promotes the law by making it operate better.  As a noted 
Aristotelian scholar, paraphrasing Aristotle, puts it, “The legal system 
works best when legislators know that defects in their products will not 
necessarily result in injustice, because equitable [judges] will be on hand to 
recognize the exceptions that were overlooked when the laws were 
adopted.”189
The judge’s role is to examine the vision animating the relevant legal 
rule, identifying all of the moral values underlying the rule.  When multiple 
and incommensurate values are involved, the judge must engage in the kind 
of practical reasoning I described earlier, what I called complementarity 
analysis.  But there is an important difference between complementarity 
analysis in Jill’s case and as it is deployed in judicial analysis.  I said earlier 
that in Jill’s case complementarity analysis is agent-relative.  Jill asks, 
among the competing values, what is the right choice for her, in terms of 
her personal vision of the kind of person she wishes to become, rather than 
what is the right choice in the abstract.  A judge has a different 
responsibility than an individual like Jill.  As Aristotle stresses, even when 
doing equity, a judge must remain faithful to the law.  Specifically, the 
judge is obligated to develop the best interpretation of the lawmakers’ 
vision of justice animating the rule in question, to identify the vision of 
what really matters from the lawmakers’ point of view, and then to see how 
the competing and incommensurate moral values best fit together to 
advance that vision.  The reasoning is still agent-relative insofar as the 
analyst is not asking what the right choice is in the abstract but with respect 
to some agent.  The relevant agent, however, is no longer the analyst.  
Rather, it is a collective agent whose collective vision of what really matters 
the judge must do her best to identify.  The judge strives to develop an 
objective understanding of the lawmakers’ vision, but the reasoning process 
  This is not a matter of rules versus standards or ad hoc 
decision making, for Aristotle favors “universal law,” i.e., rules.  Aristotle 
recognizes, however, that rules, precisely because of their generality, will 
be deficient because they are too general.  Lawmakers cannot possibly 
anticipate every conceivable circumstance, and even if they could, the rules 
that would emerge would be needlessly complex.  Hence, there are gaps, 
some intended, some not.  The role of equity, Aristotle argues, is to enable 
legal decision makers to correct these deficiencies in legal rules, not as a 
matter of refusing to enforce the law in order to do justice as they 
personally see fit but as a matter of attempting to sustain the lawmakers’ 
overall vision of justice, according to the decision maker’s best 
interpretation of that vision. 
 
 188. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 189. RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE:  POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 110 (2002). 
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is inevitably interpretive and contestable.  In Aristotle’s metaphor, the 
contour of the stone sometimes is not clear, and reasonable people may 
reasonably discern its shape differently. 
CONCLUSION 
Connecting this rather abstract discussion back to property law and 
theory, it is easy to see the attraction of monist theories such as 
utilitarianism for property scholars (and judges).  They hold out the promise 
of providing a single correct solution to cases in which seemingly difficult 
choices must be made by drawing upon the fundamental value at work in 
their theory.  But the promise is illusory.  In property disputes, as elsewhere 
in the law, the apparent value conflicts are real.  As I have argued in this 
Article, no fundamental value is available to mediate these conflicts.  The 
plurality of values that inhere in our legal property system—and other areas 
of the law—is irreducible. 
Where does this leave property theory, then?  What implications does 
value pluralism pose for property theorists?  It requires them, first, to be 
clear about whether they are pluralist.  Too many analysts have left their 
position on this important question murky.  Second, those property theorists 
who are pluralist need to attend to the vexing problem of whether rational 
choices between incommensurable values is possible and, if so, exactly by 
what reasoning process.  Too often we property scholars—and legal 
scholars generally—when confronted with the familiar dilemma of 
competing values facilely state that a solution can be found only through a 
balancing process.  Analytically, however, what exactly does this balancing 
process involve?  Does it mean, for example, that we face a zero sum 
situation in which we must choose one value and discard the other?  I have 
argued that this need not—and should not—be the case. 
There is a final implication for property scholars who are pluralist.  The 
moral pluralist accepts the possibility that there are multiple ways to choose 
well between or among competing incommensurable moral values.  In the 
context of both personal morality and law there are situations where more 
than one right option is available, and it is rational to choose among these 
options.  This view puts pluralists at odds with monists, who consider it a 
failure of pluralists that they cannot unequivocally endorse one uniquely 
correct course of action.190  But this is not a weakness of pluralism.  
Buridan’s ass191
 
 190. Louis Kaplow, for example, makes this criticism of Amartya Sen’s capabilities 
theory. See Louis Kaplow, Primary Goods, Capabilities, . . . or Well-Being?, 116 PHIL. REV. 
603 (2007). 
 can rationally choose one pile of oats over the other.  The 
 191. The allegory of Buridan’s ass illustrates the dilemma of the moral choice between 
two apparently identical items.  It was first developed by the French philosopher Jean 
Buridan (1300–58), who actually discussed a dog rather than an ass in his commentary of 
Aristotle’s De caelo. See NICHOLAS RESCHER, SCHOLASTIC MEDITATIONS 18–19 (2005) 
(discussing Buridan’s unpublished Expositio textus of the De caelo).  Buridan discusses the 
method by which a dog must choose between two equal amounts of food (of the same kind) 
placed before it. See id.  Given a symmetry of information and symmetry of preference, 
Buridan concludes, the dog must choose randomly. 
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ass is not really choosing one pile over the other but rather choosing one of 
them over starvation. 
 
